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This paper examines the European confrontation with and conceptualization 
of the China trade in the early modern world, and in particular during the 
Enlightenment. International trade was of central importance to Enlightenment 
conceptions of wealth. As Daniel Defoe – the famed champion of the merchant 
class – wrote, “the rising greatness of the British nation is not owing to war and 
conquests, to enlarging its dominion by the sword, or subjecting the people of 
other countries to our power; but it is all owing to trade, to the increase of our 
commerce at home, and extending it abroad”1. European philosophers and a 
broader set of commentators that included popular geographers and merchants 
hotly debated international trade. These debates portrayed China as having a 
more cautious, restricted view of foreign trade. No lesser authority than Adam 
Smith succinctly expressed this view:
The Chinese have little respect for foreign trade. Your beggarly commerce! was the 
language in which the Mandarins of Pekin used to talk to Mr. de Lange, the Russian 
envoy, concerning it. Except with Japan, the Chinese carry on, themselves, and in their 
own bottoms, little or no foreign trade; and it is only into one or two ports of their 
kingdom that they even admit the ships of foreign nations. Foreign trade therefore 
is, in China, every way confined within a much narrower circle than that to which it 
1 D. Defoe, The Complete English Tradesman (London: printed for Charles Rivington, 1726 [1725]), 382-3.
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would naturally extend itself, if more freedom was allowed to it, either in their own 
ships, or in those of foreign nations2.
John Hobson labeled the traditional narrative that China turned inward during 
the Ming Dynasty as “China’s great leap backward”3. Proponents of this view 
maintain that China’s decline relative to Europe began in 1434 when the Emperor 
Xuande, following the ‘Confucian traditions’ of his father, the Emperor Hongxi, 
imposed restrictions on foreign trade and navigation. According to this view, by 
the end of the eighteenth century Europeans recognized the limitations of the 
Chinese system of political economy, particularly with regards to international 
trade. Adam Smith’s advocation of the free market in 1776 and the 1793 failed 
British Embassy to China under Lord Macartney led to a dominant image of an 
arrogant China, resistant to the progress of the modernising European world4.
Frustration with Chinese policies of isolation, however, dated as far back 
as Ancient Rome, thus was not a reaction to the rising European faith in the 
mutual benefits of free trade expressed most famously through Smith. Further, 
the narrative of Chinese isolation was only part of a wider eighteenth century 
discussion of the China trade. In fact, early modern European observers and 
commentators were not assured of their superiority and reflected a range of views 
on the China trade beyond simple frustration. Recent scholarship examines the 
interaction between the Qing Dynasty and European states as the encounter of 
imperial forces, indicating a comparable balance of power5.
This paper begins by examining the early modern European sources of 
information and commentary on the China trade. These sources include the 
first-hand reports about China (largely written by European missionaries, men 
of war, merchants and emissaries); the works of Enlightenment philosophers; 
and the popularisers of information primarily in world geographies. European 
2 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. E. Cannan (New York: 
Bantam Dell, 2003), 864-5.
3 J. M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 62.
4 David Porter describes the eighteenth-century encounter between the Europeans and the 
Chinese, where the former believed in the importance of international trade, and the latter strictly 
limited international commerce, leading to “a widespread perception among British observers 
that an unnatural tendency toward blockage and obstructionism was an integral, defining 
feature of Chinese society as a whole”. D. Porter, “A Peculiar but Uninteresting Nation: China and 
the Discourse of Commerce in Eighteenth Century England”, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 33 (1999-
2000), 181-199; James L. Hevia describes the historiographical tradition (from Euro-America as 
well as China) of viewing the early modern trade relationship between China and Europe as a 
clash between tradition and modernity. J. L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and 
the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 242; Joanna Waley-Cohen 
argues that Sinophilia ended, in part, because “the restrictive Canton system of trade went 
directly against the free world market advocated by Adam Smith in 1776”. J. Waley-Cohen, The 
Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 92- 99.
5 See Hevia’s Cherishing Men from Afar.
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ambitions of achieving a bountiful trading relationship with China, met 
with the reality of Chinese restrictions. The interplay between optimism and 
rejection led to a consistent narrative of frustration in many European sources. 
The remainder of this paper analyses the other prominent narratives attached 
to the China trade. In addition to a view of Chinese restrictions on foreign 
trade, which certainly existed, three additional themes were conspicuous. 
First, Europeans attempted to understand China’s unique ability to restrict 
international trade. Second, they identified obstacles to trade that originated 
in Europe. Finally, these sources discussed the nature of the trade that did exist, 
debated the implications of the balance of trade with China, and demonstrated 
an awareness of China’s place in a global trading system. This paper concludes 
that the overarching image of China was that of a uniquely large and 
independent country that had the ability to restrict international trade, and 
when they did partake in it, they maintained a formidable position. Concurrent 
to this image was the view held by many (but not all) that China would benefit 
from expanding its international trade, a view supported by the idea that their 
history of fluctuating trade policies indicated that increasing foreign trade was 
possible. Further, criticisms of European trade  policies reveals that Europeans 
did not assume the perfection of their own practices.
I. From El Dorado to Impervious: travel and trade literature on China
Little information travelled, and even less trade took place, between Europe and 
China in the period between the collapse of the Sino-Roman trade in the fourth 
century and Marco Polo’s account of Cathay at the end of the thirteenth century. It 
was only with the expansion of the sea route to the coast of Southern China in 1514 
and the rise of the printing press that the demand for goods from – and information 
on – the Middle Kingdom could be met. In this period, trade, religion (Catholicism), 
and information on China were intertwined. Portugal, for example, received the 
padroado (patronage) with the Jus patronatus granted by a papal bull in 1514, vesting 
exclusive control of European missionary, political and economic activity in the East 
with the Portuguese monarchy. Their control of European engagement with the East 
did not last long, and the Dutch and English quickly expanded their commercial 
interests. Catholic missionaries from other European states such as Italy, Spain, 
France and Germany continued to travel to and transmit information on China. 
In their roles as translators and influencers of Chinese opinions, these European 
missionaries acted in the interest of their own missionary orders, and at times in 
their national interests. For instance, in 1697 and 1698 a group of French Jesuits 
urged the French government to develop a chartered company for the China trade to 
search for alternative trade routes from those controlled by the English and Dutch6. 
6 D. F. Lach and E. J. van Kley, Asia in the making of Europe, 3 vols., 3 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 432.
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Although the Jesuit missionaries were primarily concerned with their religious 
mission, they did provide information highly relevant to the China trade7.
Another group that provided information about the China trade – 
merchants, explorers, men of war and emissaries – was less interested in the 
Christianizing agenda of the missionaries. The attempts to develop a trading 
relationship with China led to the arrival of ambassadors from states such as 
Russia, the Netherlands, France, and England as well as representatives from 
their respective East India Companies. Between 1552 and 1800 there were 
926 Jesuits in China. As early as 1563 there were already 700 Portuguese non-
missionaries in Macao8. Although these secular travelers offered less insightful 
commentary than the Jesuits who gained access to the Chinese court, many 
of these sources were continuously referred to and had a transformative 
effect on European thought. They were also first-hand witnesses to China’s 
restrictive trade policies and thus, on this topic in particular, their point of view 
is germane. In the seventeenth century, merchant accounts from China were 
primarily Dutch, as the Netherlands began to dominate the China trade9. By the 
eighteenth century, British travelers made the most significant contribution to 
the expansion of non-missionary accounts of China10. The interaction between 
European national interests, missionary activity, commercial concerns, and 
Chinese policy from the sixteenth century onwards was of great importance to 
the formation of primary sources, and ultimately European views of China as a 
political, economic and cultural entity.
These primary sources provided information for the editors of geographies. 
The growth of these popular works over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
was in large part driven by the desire for information pertaining to the prospects 
for international trade, and many of these sources had commercial ideologies 
embedded in their texts11. Richard Hakluyt commissioned Robert Parke’s 1588 
7 In particular, the Jesuits Matteo Ricci, Nicolas Trigault, Louis Le Comte and Jean Baptiste 
Du Halde (who himself had never actually travelled to China, but did have access to Jesuit 
information), provided first-hand information on the Chinese Empire. 
8 A. Rowbotham, “The Impact of Confucianism on Seventeenth Century Europe”, The Far 
Eastern Quarterly, 4 (1945): 50. 
9 The Dutch fort in southern Taiwan was established in 1624, and though they were 
anxious to trade with China, the embassies they sent to Peking in 1656, 1667 and 1685 all 
failed. One of the most widely cited and translated works was Johan Nieuhof ’s An Embassy 
from the East India Company (1665 Dutch edition, published in English in London, 1669). 
Nieuhof ’s work was based on a Dutch East India Company delegation to China, which he 
took part in from 1655-57.
10 The most popular example in this genre is George Anson’s Voyage Around the World (1748). 
The first edition had over 1800 advanced subscribers, by 1776 there had been fifteen editions in 
Britain alone and it had been translated into French, Dutch, German and Italian, C. Mackerras, 
Western Images of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 47. 
11 R. Markley, The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600-1730. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 270.
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English translation of the Spanish Augustian Juan González de Mendoza’s 
description of China, which demonstrates this type of demand. Parke dedicated 
his translation to the English explorer Thomas Cavandish who, he hoped, would 
find a new trade route to Asia. Parke also praised the teenage King Edward VI for 
his encouragement of the beneficial trade with the East 35 years earlier12. Another 
example of the connection between trade and information on China is found in 
the first English translation of the Jesuit Jean-Baptiste Du Halde’s description 
of China, translated by Richard Brookes and printed by John Watts in 1736. 
While it was the less reliable of the two English translations, of interest here 
is Brooke’s motivation for the quick translation of the work. Brookes dedicated 
the fourth volume “To the Directors of the United Company of Merchants of 
England trading to the East Indies”13. In this dedication, Brookes noted: “It is a 
fond mistaken Notion of some” that Britain is self-sustainable and does not need 
anything from the rest of the world when “the most common Repast must be 
supply’d with Ingredients from the remotest Parts of the Globe”14.
The final group of interested commentators was the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment who debated the implications of the China trade. Douglas Irwin’s 
intellectual history of free trade is divided into two parts: the pre-Smithian 
protectionist view culminating in the mercantilist literature of the seventeenth 
century, and the post-Smithian period of the triumph of the arguments for 
free trade15. While these periods certainly overlapped, the eighteenth century 
in particular represents a transitionary period, which is situated between the 
apogee of the mercantilist view and the publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations (1776). Prior to the establishment of a largely consensus view in favor of 
free-market trade, philosophers debated policies of international trade.
The primary, geographical and philosophical sources oscillated between 
optimism and disappointment in their discussions of the China trade. On the 
one hand, there was an air of hope for the potential wealth that the China trade 
could generate. The sixteenth century witnessed the start of a search for distant 
lands that could offer easy profits. Popular literature of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries expressed the hope of finding foreign lands that offered 
bountiful trade relationships. Voltaire commented on the dreams of easy profits 
in his popular novel Candide (1759). Upon leaving El Dorado, Candide exclaims: 
“if we return to our own world with only a dozen of El Dorado sheep, loaded with 
12 J. Gonzales de Mendoza, The Historie of the Great and Mightie Kingdome of China, translated 
by R. Parke, printed by I. Wolfe for Edward White in 1588 (Reprint: Amsterdam: Da Capo 
Press, 1973), 2. 
13 J. B. Du Halde, The General History of China. Containing a geographical, historical, chronological, 
political and physical description of the empire of China, translated by Richard Brookes from the 
Paris edition, 4 vols., 4 (London: printed by and for John Watts, 1736), Dedication.
14 Du Halde, Vol. 4, Dedication.
15 D. Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996), 3.
210
the pebbles of this country, we shall be richer than all the kings in Europe”16. 
The reports of the grand scale of the Chinese Empire, and its significant wealth, 
came to represent another El Dorado, and a tangible object for the European 
desire for profits.
However, Europeans expressed a concurrent frustration with the 
practicalities involved in the China trade. The earliest descriptions of China 
by European authors reveal a long history of the theme of Chinese isolation. 
Ancient Romans described a place known as Serica (believed to refer to the 
north-eastern part of modern day China). Pliny the Elder, for example, claimed 
“The Seres are of inoffensive manners, but, bearing a strong resemblance 
therein to all savage nations, they shun all intercourse with the rest of mankind, 
and await the approach of those who wish to traffic with them”17. This history 
was not lost on eighteenth century commentators, as a popular compendium 
about China, The Chinese Traveller (1772), addressed the antiquity of the view 
of Chinese isolation: “It is remarkable that the manners of the modern differ 
not much from those of the ancient Chinese […] [Pliny] says that the Chinese 
[…] like wild animals industriously shun any communication with strangers 
[…]. They are at this day courteous and gentle, but will not suffer merchants 
of other nations to penetrate into their country”18. Indeed, China’s restrictive 
policies continued into the early modern world. In 1517, Tomé Pires led the first 
official embassy from a European state (Portugal) to China. The reality of China’s 
foreign policy quickly moderated the Portuguese enthusiasm when after their 
long journey the Portuguese emissaries were not granted an audience with 
the emperor. The Portuguese conquering of Malacca (a tributary state of the 
Chinese), as well as their thieving and disruptive behavior around Canton led 
to the Chinese constraints19. China sentenced Pires to death because of the 
actions of his compatriots, and he took his own life in prison. The recurrence 
of this archetypal embassy by the English, French, Dutch and Russians, despite 
continuing failures to gain significant trade concessions, demonstrated the 
European determination to expand the China trade20.
16 Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet), Candide, translated by Norman Cameron (London: 
Penguin, 2001), 52.
17 Pliny the Elder, The Natural History, eds. J. Bostock and H. T. Riley (1885), Book VI, Chapter XX, 
“The Seres”, ed. G. Crane (The Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University), 2036-2037.
18 Author/Editor Unknown, The Chinese Traveller […] Collected from Du Halde, Le Compte, and other 
Modern Travellers, 1 (London: Printed for E. and C. Dilly, 1772), v.
19 J. E. Wills Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K’ang-hsi (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 1984), 19.
20 Between 1655 and 1795 there were approximately seventeen Western missions that reached 
the emperor (six from Russia, four from Portugal, three or four from Holland, three from the 
Papacy, and one from Britain). J. K. Fairbank, “Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West”, 
The Far Eastern Quarterly, 1 (1942): 148-149. For more information on failed trade negotiations see 
Markley, The Far East and the English Imagination, Ch. 3 and Wills, Embassies and Illusions.
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The failure of early modern European trade missions reflected China’s 
ability to resist the foreign overtures. Unlike other parts of the world, threats 
of violence were insufficient to achieve the European desire for open trade with 
China. Rather, Chinese trade concessions were erratic and highly dependent 
on the emperor. The Chinese, according to John Wills Jr., never had anything 
resembling “a coherent or effective foreign policy”21. These inconsistencies 
were increasingly difficult for Europeans to understand as they rationalized 
international trade as ordained or natural. Despite the idiosyncrasies of 
Chinese policy, Europeans attempted to understand the principles behind their 
reluctance to engage in international trade.
II. Understanding Chinese trade policy
Early descriptions of the Chinese, including those by the Jesuits, depicted an 
arrogant nation who believed they were the center of the world. Addressing the 
reluctance of the Chinese to partake in international trade, the Jesuits Matteo Ricci 
and Nicolas Trigault concluded that “[Chinese] pride, it would seem, arises from 
an ignorance of the existence of higher things and from the fact that they find 
themselves far superior to the barbarous nations by which they are surrounded”22. 
Or, as Thomas Salmon argued in his popular compendium, they looked upon “the 
rest of mankind as little better than brutes”23. This assertion was supported by 
the knowledge that the Chinese had access to the compass before the Europeans, 
and yet explored little in comparison. However, Europeans sought to understand 
China’s motivations for restricting trade beyond simple arrogance.
In the seventeenth century, numerous European observers respected China’s 
policy of limiting international trade. The expansion of European interests 
overseas, concurrent with internal wars, revolutions and the spread of disease, 
reminded many early modern observers of the lessons from Ancient Rome, and 
concerns about overexpansion led some to admire China’s restraint. One of the 
early Iberian accounts of China by Gaspar da Cruz described how the Chinese 
had a large empire earlier in their history, ruling over Malacca, Siam and Champa 
in Southeast Asia. He explained their motivations for reducing this empire and 
turning inwards: “the King of China, seeing that his kingdom went to decay, 
21 Wills, Embassies and Illusions, 20.
22 Matteo Ricci and Nicolas Trigault’s De Christiana Expeditione apud Sinas was an important source 
of information about China at the time, and was one of the most widely cited (or plagiarised) 
early modern primary accounts of China. First published in 1615, it had 4 Latin editions, 3 
French editions, 1 edition respectively in German, Spanish, Italian and English excerpts were 
reproduced in S. Purchas, His Pilgrimes […] (1625). N. Trigault and M. Ricci, China in the Sixteenth 
Century: the journals of Matthew Ricci: 1583-1610 [The compilation by N. Trigault] translated from 
the Latin by Louis J. Gallagher (New York: Random House, 1953), 23.
23 T. Salmon, Modern History: or, the present state of all nations […], 3 vols., 1 (London: Printed for T. 
Longman, T. Osborne, et. al., 1744-463), 15.
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and was in danger by their seeking to conquer many other foreign countries, 
he withdrew himself with his men to his own kingdom”24. Edward Gibbon 
chronicled this notion of internal decay from overexpansion in his influential 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776). Several European geographers and 
philosophers praised China’s policy as wise. In Relazioni Universali (1591-1598), 
Giovanni Botero explained China’s motivations for restricting foreign interaction 
to protect their customs and government. He commended the Chinese disinterest 
in international expansion because the author believed “there can bee no greater 
folly than to hazard our own goods, on hope to gaine others”25. By the eighteenth 
century a few European philosophers and geographers also explained China’s 
caution towards entering into relationships with foreign states. For instance, 
Guillaume-Thomas Raynal reminded his readers of the problems in the Sino-
Portuguese encounters during the time of Tomé Pires; under those circumstances, 
what incentive did the Chinese have to expand their foreign relations26? However, 
by the eighteenth century overseas trade and exploration increased and the 
potential risks associated with it were outweighed by the perceived benefits.
Another explanation for China’s restrictive policies gained prominence in the 
eighteenth century, though it originated in earlier sources. It was based on the 
belief that China’s domestic trade made their Empire self-sufficient thus they had 
no need for international commerce. Mendoza, who had never been to China 
himself, was one of the first European authors to popularize this explanation. 
He described how China’s isolation from international trade was possible 
because they have sufficient of all things necessarie to the mainteining of human 
life”27. The reports about the activity on China’s rivers and canals astonished 
Mendoza: “In my opinion it might be said with greater truth and without fear of 
exaggeration, that there are as many boats in this kingdom as can be counted up 
in all the rest of the world”28. This argument was popularized in the eighteenth 
century by Du Halde who controversially stated the vastness of China’s domestic 
24 South China in the Sixteenth Century: Being the Narratives of Galeote Pereira, Fr. Gaspar da Cruz, O. P., 
Fr. Martin de Rada, O.E. S. A., ed. C. R. Boxer (Bangkok: Orchid Press, 2004), 67.
25 G. Botero, Relations, of the most famous Kingdoms and Common-weales through the World […] 
(London: Printed for John Jaggard, 16084), 300 and 295. This excerpt was accurately translated 
from the original Italian, see G. Botero, Delle Relationi Universali (Venetia: Nicolò Polo, 1602), 
Parte Seconda, 66.
26 Though in the final edition these paragraphs were found in chapter twenty-one (which has 
been attributed to Denis Diderot), the paragraphs in question were also in an earlier edition in a 
section attributed to Raynal. G. T. Raynal and D. Diderot, A Philosophical and Political History of the 
Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indes, translated by J. O. Justamond from 
the 1780 French edition, 8 vols., 4 (London: printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1783), 192-193. 
For the original French see G. T. Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du 
commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes (Tome I. Livres I-V), eds. Anthony Strugnell, et.al. (Paris: 
Centre International d’étude du XVIIIe Siècle and Ferney-Voltaire, 2010), 15.
27 Mendoza, Histoire [...] of China, 69-70.
28 Mendoza, Histoire [...] of China 12-13.
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trade compared to that of the whole Europe: “The inland trade of China is so great, 
that the commerce of all Europe is not to be compar’d therewith; the princes 
like so many kingdoms, which communicate to each other their respective 
productions”29. Made during a period of rapid expansion of European trade, this 
bold assertion was repeated numerous times in popular compendiums30.
Philosophical sources differed in their assessment of the claim that China’s 
domestic trade was larger than Europe’s. Montesquieu believed the argument 
was irrelevant. In De l’esprit des lois (1748), he described the implications of 
European global expansion. He argued, “Europe has reached such a high degree 
of power that nothing in history is comparable to it”31. Immediately after 
claiming European power and dominance, he felt the need to challenge the 
relevance of Du Halde’s contention about the relative size of China’s domestic 
trade, indicating his view that the claim challenged European supremacy. 
He argued that China’s internal commerce might be larger than Europe’s but 
European foreign trade was, in fact, much greater32.
A fellow Frenchman, François Quesnay, vehemently contested Montesquieu’s 
view of China. In a section entitled “Commerce Viewed as Serving Agriculture” 
in Le Despotisme de la Chine (1767), Quesnay used China as a model to attack the 
belief that “nations must trade with foreigners in order to grow rich in money”33. 
He repeated Du Halde’s assertion that China’s internal trade was greater than 
Europe’s and that each Chinese province specialised in particular products, 
making commerce between them necessary. Opposed to the mercantilist 
view, Quesnay believed foreign commerce was injurious and served only to 
profit the merchant class. He could not find an example of a nation attached to 
foreign commerce and provided an example of prosperity. The Chinese system, 
according to the Physiocrat, represented the Natural Order and thus he praised 
their elevation of domestic trade above foreign commerce.
29 J. B. Du Halde, A description of the empire of China 2 vols., 1 (London: printed by T. Gardner 
for Edward Cave, 1738), 334. Accurately translated from the original French see J. B. Du Halde, 
Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l’empire de la Chine. 4 
vols., 2 (La Haye: Chez P. G. Le Mercier, 1735), 169.
30 For instance a direct quotation can be found in The Chinese Traveller, 189; C. F. Lambert, A 
Collection of curious Observations on the Manners, Customs, Usages, different Languages, Government 
[…], 2 (London, 1750), 386.
31 C. L. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, eds. A. M. Cohler, B. C. Miller 
and H. S. Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 393. Accurately translated from 
the original French see C.L. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (Genève: 
Barillot et fils, 1748), 71.
32 Montesquieu, The Sprit of the Laws, 393. For the original French see Montesquieu, De l’esprit 
des lois, 71.
33 F. Quesnay, Oeuvres Économiques et Philosophiques, ed. Auguste Oncken (Paris: Jules Peelman 
and Co., 1888), 603. For the English translation see L. A. Maverick, China a Model for Europe 
(San Antonia: Paul Anderson Co., 1946), 208. Quesnay published Despotisme de la Chine in four 
consecutive editions of the journal Ephémérides du Citoyen.
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Adam Smith, who had a great deal of respect for the French économiste, also 
believed China was uniquely situated for domestic commerce and disagreed with 
the mercantilist view of wealth, however he did believe in the benefits of foreign 
trade. Smith argued China’s geography deterred it from foreign trade because its 
neighbors were not rich and
the great extent of the empire of China, the vast multitude of its inhabitants, 
the variety of climate, and consequently of productions in different provinces, 
and easy communcation by means of water carriage between the greater part of 
them render the home market of that country of so great extent, as to be alone 
sufficient to support very great manufactures, and to admit of very considerable 
subdivisions of labour34.
Following Du Halde’s and Quesnay’s assertion that Chinese products were 
diversified, Smith argued that China had significant subdivisions of labor. From 
the Scottish philosopher this was a great compliment indeed, as he asserted 
in The Wealth of Nations (1776) that the division of labour was key to economic 
growth. However, Smith moderated the assessment of the size of China’s 
domestic trade claiming it was “not much more inferior to the market of all 
the different countries of Europe put together”35. By the end of the eighteenth 
century with European commerce rapidly expanding, even the tempered claim 
that China’s domestic market was near the size of all of Europe’s and the view that 
China had significant subdivisions of labor from its internal commerce were 
both complimentary of the Chinese system.
Recognizing China’s self-sufficiency did not mean abandoning hope for its 
engagement in an active international trade. Smith argued that “a more extensive 
foreign trade […] could scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of China, 
and to improve very much the productive powers of its manufacturing industry” 
as well as offering externalities such as extensive navigation, technology transfer 
and “other improvements of art and industry”36. It was possible to understand 
China’s reasons and respect its ability to limit foreign trade, and still believe that 
a profitable trade was in its interest, and indeed was possible.
Primary authors, geographers and philosophers ruminated on China’s 
unique reasons for restricting international trade, as well as its unusual ability 
to garner significant wealth from internal commerce. China offered a different 
model for growth that depended almost entirely on domestic consumption 
and production. European observers and commentators demonstrated a more 
complex understanding of Chinese policy than ignorant, arrogant isolationism, 
and they were not assured of the superiority of their own trade practices.
34 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 865-6.
35 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 866.
36 Ibid. 
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III. A European problem? National rivalries and monopolies
While Europeans attempted to understand and even, at times, appreciate 
China’s restrictions on international trade, the policies of the Middle Kingdom 
also offered an opportunity to analyze European trade practices. Indeed, many 
observers maintained that the European system itself was at fault for limiting 
the China trade.
National rivalries, particularly between the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch 
and English, led to competing European interests hindering advancements 
in East Asian trade. During the first half of the seventeenth century, the 
Dutch began to make their presence in East Asia felt. Unlike the Spanish and 
Portuguese, the Protestant Dutch (and later the English) were not as concerned 
with spreading Christianity, but focused their empires largely on commerce. 
The Dutch East India Company (VOC), formed in 1602, was in direct conflict 
with the Portuguese-declared monopoly of Asian trade. As such, the VOC was 
given authority to “wage defensive war, negotiate treaties of peace and alliance 
in the name of the States General, and build fortresses”37. This led to several 
VOC attacks on the Portuguese establishment at Macao. Ultimately, the Dutch 
gained a monopoly in the Japan trade and increased their presence in East Asia 
throughout the seventeenth century. By 1685, with the opening of Canton to 
foreign trade, the English began to assert their standing in the China trade. 
The divided London and English East India companies formally united in 1708 
giving the British a strong position in the East Indian trade.
The descriptions of European observers reveal the nationalism involved 
in international trade with China – and the East Indies in general. In the 
seventeenth century Johan Nieuhof, a VOC purser of a Dutch embassy to 
China, publicized the tension between the Dutch and the Portuguese in the 
Far East. He argued his mission to negotiate a free trade with the Chinese 
government was doomed from that start because the Portuguese at Macao and 
the Portuguese Jesuits in Peking had portrayed the Dutch as people dwellers 
without a country who “got their livings by stealth and piracy”38. Raynal 
repeated these descriptions in the eighteenth century, reminding his readers 
how in 1607 the Dutch tried to open up the China trade but “The Portuguese 
found means, by bribery, and the intrigues of their missionaries, to get the 
Hollanders excluded”39. It became evident to European commentators, 
through these sources, that conflicts between European countries greatly 
affected trading relationships with China.
37 Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe, 45.
38 J. Nieuhof, An Embassy from the East-India Company of the United Provinces, trans. John Ogilby 
(London: Printed by the author at his house in White Friers, 16732), 154.
39 Raynal and Diderot, A Philosophical and Political History, Vol. 1, 246. For the original French see 
Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique, 160.
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England expressed similar frustrations over conflicts with the Portuguese 
and the Dutch. Direct conflicts such as the 1623 Amboyna massacre of twenty 
men, ten of whom were members of the British East India Company, by agents 
of the VOC undoubtedly contributed to the tone of tracts on the China trade. 
The national competitiveness led to a mistrust of information circulating on the 
China trade: “The difficulty of trading with the Chineses in their own Country, 
is not so difficult as the Portingals and Hollanders would perswade the World 
for their own advantage”40. The anonymous author of this tract on the East India 
Company argued that, despite the hindrances by the Portuguese, the English 
have traded in Canton with great success.
Over the course of the eighteenth century, national rivalries were less 
prominent explanations for the inability to establish a flourishing China trade. 
European commentators began to argue the largest problem on the European 
side of the trade was not the competition between countries, but rather the 
lack of competition between companies, and the inability of any one European 
power to impose a monopoly over the trade of China against rivals. This was a 
result of the rising power of the European East India companies. The debate over 
the impact of chartered companies and monopolies in the China trade featured 
prominently in eighteenth century British popular sources, where many argued 
against the monopolies and for the rights of individual merchants. For instance, 
a letter addressed to the Aldermen of the City of London in 1754 attacked the 
claim that free merchants did not have the ability to carry on the East India trade 
in the same manner as the East India Company. The anonymous author argued 
that “every one knows, that the trade to China may be carried on from Britain 
directly, as it is from Sweden, and that, without a Company the same may be 
done from all other parts”41. The high level of country trade (local trade that took 
place in the East Indies) conducted by free merchants indicated their ability to 
be successful and “they do not ruin themselves, nor do they lose the trade, or 
give away all the profits to the natives”42.
In contrast to the idea that China was solely responsible for limiting the 
number of ports where international trade could be conducted, some believed 
this was a decision made by European East India companies. Joshua Gee, an 
English merchant, argued that the English East India Company was at fault 
for limiting the China trade, and in particular, the number of ports at which 
international trade was conducted. He believed that although the sales of British 
woollen goods would be higher in the colder, northern Chinese provinces, the 
40 Unknown Author, The East-India trade [n. p.] [1641?] (The Making of the Modern World, 
Thomson Gale, University of London Research Library Services), 8.
41 Letters relating to the East India Company […] (London: Printed for W. Owen, 1754), 24. This 
work has been attributed to John Campbell. 
42 A Third Collection of scarce and valuable Tracts, on the most interesting and entertaining subjects […], 
4 vols., 3 (London: Printed for F. Cogan, 1751). 212.
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English captains chose to stay at Canton. According to Gee, private traders knew 
better: “But when private traders had liberty to go to China, they were of another 
opinion; they went to those places where they could get most money”43. Indeed, 
in reality, the East India companies hindered the China trade. E.H. Pritchard 
points out that the English abandoned their factories at the ports of Amoy and 
Chusan in 1707 and 1710 respectively because of the favorable possibilities of 
trade at Canton. This was well before the 1757 official Chinese restriction of 
foreign trade to Canton44. A popular dictionary of trade in the eighteenth century 
described the “inducement which the European merchants have to frequent 
Canton” in comparison to Amoy, namely that whole fleets “may be freighted in 
a short time there, and are not in danger of being delayed til the monsoon sets 
in […]”45. By 1740, the British met with a solid monopoly in Canton, the Hong 
Merchants (a small group of elite merchants who dominated the entire Canton 
trade). By 1762, to combat the strength of the Hong monopoly, the English East 
India Company created one unified council to regulate all of its ships. Thus the 
trade was a dual monopoly where the interests of both China and Britain were 
represented, and vehemently defended.
Enlightenment philosophers, especially those of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
devoted a great deal of time to analyzing the distorting nature of these chartered 
companies. David Hume was one of the first prominent scholars to point out 
those European actions that hindered the China trade (particularly as expressed 
by the varying prices in gold and silver): “Thus the immense distance of 
China, together with the monopolies of our India companies, obstructing the 
communication, preserve in Europe the gold and silver, especially the latter, in 
much greater plenty than they are found in that kingdom”46. Later, Adam Smith 
also pointed to the negative impact of the monopolistic system. If, as he argued, 
“rich and civilized nations can always exchange to a much greater value with 
one another than with savages and barbarians”, he had to explain how Europe 
has “derived much less advantage from its commerce with the East Indies from 
that with America”. To answer this puzzle he did not turn to descriptions of 
43 J. Gee, The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain considered […] A new edition […] by a merchant 
(London: printed for J. Almon, 1767), 61; A. Dalrymple, A Plan for extending the Commerce of this 
Kingdom, and of the East-India-Company (London: printed for the author, 1769), 7 also describes 
the high demand for wool in China but being limited by the trade at Canton, which was further 
away from the cold areas of the empire. 
44 E. H. Pritchard, The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750-1800 (1936), reprinted in 
Britain and the China Trade, 1635-1842, ed. P. Tuck, 10 vols., 5 (London-New York: Routledge, 1999), 114.
45 R. Rolt, A New Dictionary of Trade and Commerce, compiled from the Information of the most 
eminent Merchants, and from the works of the best writers (London: printed for T. Osborne, J. 
Shipton, et. al., 1756), 130. 
46 D. Hume, “Of the Balance of Trade”, in Essays Moral, Political, Literary, ed. E. F. Miller, with 
an appendix of variant readings from the 1889 edition by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, revised 
edition (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987).
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isolationism, but rather blamed the fact that the “Portuguese monopolized the 
East India trade to themselves for about a century” and when the Dutch began 
in the seventeenth century to expand in that area, “they vested their whole East 
India commerce in an exclusive company”. He continued on:
The English, French, Swedes, and Danes have all followed their example, so that no 
great nation in Europe has ever yet had the benefit of a free commerce to the East 
Indies. No other reason need by assigned why it has never been so advantageous as the 
trade to America, which, between almost every nation of Europe and its own colonies, 
is free to all its subjects47.
While Smith recognized the Chinese reasons for restricting foreign trade, he also 
attributed some of the blame to the European system of national monopolies.
European observers and commentators recognized the European policies 
that hindered the China trade, particularly the influence of national rivalries 
and the existence of competing monopolies. The China trade was used to reflect 
on the flaws in thier own theories and policies. Europeans did not assume their 
foreign trade practices were superlative. Smith believed China would improve 
if it expanded its foreign trade. However, he also argued European countries 
would grow if they revised their own trade practices.
IV. Power dynamics in the China trade
Although the primary sources, geographers and philosophers attempted to 
understand the limitations of the China trade (both from the Chinese and European 
perspectives), they were also aware that some international trade did exist. In this 
trade China maintained a strong position and Europeans debated whether this 
commerce hindered or helped expand the wealth of their own countries.
From knowledge of active Chinese encouragement of foreign trade, to the 
numerous ways in which Europeans and Chinese merchants could exchange 
goods without formal permissions, Europeans of the Enlightenment realized 
that while China restricted its trade, the country it was never completely 
isolated. During the Ming Dynasty, European sources described how some 
foreign trade with China occurred under the guise of tribute, a context that gave 
the Chinese a dominant position in the relationship48. However, the Europeans 
sent few missions to the court of China, and the missions that were sent did 
not submit to tributary status. There was also an understanding that policies 
did not always dictate reality and subterfuge trade existed. For instance, Richard 
47 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 564.
48 For instance see O. Dapper, Atlas Chinensis, trans. John Ogilby (London, 1671), 2. Note the title 
page misattributes this work to Arnoldus Montanus, whose text on Japan was published by 
Ogilby the previous year. Dapper’s work was a second edition to Nieuhof’s account of the Dutch 
East India Company embassy to China.
219european views of the china trade
Rolt in a dictionary on trade and commerce noted “the exportation of gold is 
prohibited in China; but the magistrates, notwithstanding, will privately sell it 
to the Europeans”49. Finally, primary reports indicated the Chinese took part in 
country trade50.
With the transition from the Ming to Qing Dynasty in 1644, primary sources 
of information reported China’s active encouragement of international trade. The 
Jesuit Louis Le Comte’s Nouveaux Mémoires (1696) was one of the first sources to 
explain the effect that dynastic change had on the China trade. He described the 
tenth “principle maxim” of Qing policy “to encourage trade as much as possible 
thro’ the whole empire [… and] to increase commerce, foreigners have been 
permitted to come into the ports of China, a thing till lately never known”51. In 
the eighteenth century, Du Halde reiterated these changes in Chinese policy and 
pointed out that the ports had been opened to all nations, though adding the 
qualifications that it was only the port of Canton that is open to Europeans, and 
then only at certain times of the year, and even then they must anchor outside 
the port52. In spite of these limitations, a belief remained that China still offered 
opportunities for trade. The secular primary authors also described China’s active 
encouragement of foreign trade. For instance, a description of Laurence Lange’s 
envoy to China in 1717 published in John Green’s A New General Collection of Voyages 
(1745-7) claimed the Kang-Hsi Emperor gave money from his own treasury to 
encourage Chinese merchants to trade with the visiting Russians. He also reported 
that when the Russians could not find vent for their goods the Emperor removed 
duties on trade, which cost him 20, 000 ounces of silver53. Thus, Europeans were 
aware of the trade that existed and of the changes in the Chinese policy.
Whether the China trade was beneficial to European countries, however, was a 
more contentious topic. From 1699 to 1751 an estimated ninety percent of British 
exports to China was silver54. In exchange for the silver, the English primarily 
49 Rolt, A New Dictionary, 130. 
50 L. Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations typographical, physical, mathematical, mechanical, 
natural, civil, and ecclesiastical, made in a late Journey through the Empire of China […], translated 
from the Paris edition (London: Printed for B. Tooke and Sam Buckley, 1697), 290. Accurately 
translated from the original French see L. Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la 
Chine, 2 vols., 2 (Paris: Chez Jean Anisson, 16972), 74; Thomas Salmon’s reiterated this point 
in the eighteenth century, describing how the Chinese carried merchandise within the 
Indian seas, particularly to India, Japan, the Philippines, and Java, where they then trade with 
Europeans. Salmon, 461.
51 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 290. For the original French see Le Comte, Nouveaux 
mémoires, Vol. 2, 73.
52 Du Halde, A Description of the Empire of China, Vol. 1, 335. For the original French see Du Halde, 
Description géographique, Vol. 2, 173.
53 Astley and Green, A New General Collection of Voyages and Travels, Vol. 4, 579.
54 H. B. Morse, Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834, 4 vols., 1 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1926-29), 307-313.
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received luxury goods from China such as porcelain, silk and tea55. The China 
trade was large enough that it enabled the development of a chinoiserie trend in 
Europe, and caused some concern over the balance of trade56. Though antithetical 
to the idea that China was isolating itself from significant European trade, the 
commerce with China occasioned debate over the implications of the massive 
influx of Chinese luxury goods in exchange for European precious metals.
Before the sea route to East Asia was sufficiently opened to expand the China 
trade in the seventeenth century, there was little discussion about the balance of 
trade. For instance, in the sixteenth century, Mendoza did not express concern 
about the influx of goods from China, but this is not surprising as the significant 
flow of goods from China was yet to begin, and there was still hope that China 
would begin to accept European manufactured goods (not just silver). However, 
as trade increased, the debate over balance of trade intensified and by the 
seventeenth century, foreign trade was an extremely divisive topic. The group 
referred to as the mercantilists were diverse and the common traits that bind 
them historiographically are disputed57. A sub-category of mercantilists labeled 
“bullionists” viewed the outward flow of silver in terms of the export of wealth 
(an idea that originated in earlier Spanish debates).
The varying views of the intrinsic value of money fundamentally shaped 
the balance of trade debate. Revisionist economic historians argue that silver 
should be regarded as a commodity rather than ‘money’. Many primary authors 
and Enlightenment geographers and philosophers agreed with this perspective 
and recognized the arbitrage profits from the silver trade to China. Thomas 
Astley’s popular travel collection described how Europe’s increasing trade with 
China led to goods such as “cloths, crystals, swords, clocks, striking-watches, 
repeating-clocks, telescopes, looking-glasses, etc” becoming “as cheap as in 
Europe […] so that at present there is no trading to Advantage with any-thing 
but Silver in China; where considerable profit may be made by purchasing gold, 
which is a commodity there”58.
55 H. Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800, 2 vols., 2 (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1976), 127 and 175. 
56 The extent to which China was isolated is debated by a group of global economic historians 
deemed “Eurocentrists” such as E. L. Jones, The European Miracle (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981) and D. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Co., 1998) who maintain that China turned inwards; and “revisionists”, such as J. M. Blaut, 
Eight Eurocentric Historians (New York: The Guilford Press, 2000), who admits that the Chinese 
government discouraged, and at times prohibited, oceanic trade, but nonetheless argues an 
intense level of trade occurred in spite of these restrictions.
57 See D. C. Coleman, “Mercantilism Revisited”, The Historical Journal, 23 (1980): 773-791 
for a review of the historiographical problems surrounding the study of mercantilism. E. F. 
Heckscher, Mercantilism, ed. E. F. Söderlund, 2 vols. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 19552).
58 Astley and Green, A New General Collection of Voyages and Travels, 4 vols., 125. The same 
argument was made in The modern part of an universal history […], 44 vols., 8 (London: Printed for 
S. Richardson, et. al., 1759), 238.
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The drainage of specie to China did not concern Adam Smith, as the staunch 
anti-mercantilist viewed silver as a commodity. He argued that there were two 
consequences of the annual exportation of silver to the East Indies: the first 
was that plate was somewhat more expensive in Europe, and the second that 
coined silver rose in value. However, Smith maintained that these consequences 
were “too insignificant to deserve any part of the public attention”59. Not all 
philosophers agreed. In 1732 Richard Cantillon, an Irish author, argued for 
maintaining a favorable balance of trade, which to him meant exporting 
manufactured products60. He believed the East India trade was profitable to the 
Dutch Republic, at the expense of the rest of Europe, because the Dutch traded 
the Eastern goods to Germany, Italy, Spain and the new World in return for 
money, which they sent to the Indies to buy more goods. While his view on the 
balance of trade slowly lost currency, Cantillon was an early observer of the global 
dimensions of the trade network and the place of the East India trade within it61.
Popular geographies also identified the importance of China in global trade. 
For instance, a geography by Joseph Randall, a schoolteacher and agriculturalist, 
published in 1743 demonstrated awareness that trade was not bilateral and deficits 
should not be considered in isolation of the global system. Describing the East Indies 
trade, he argued British exports to China, India and Persia, which included bullion, 
clothes and several other items were exchanged for goods such as china-ware, tea, 
and cabinets “of which, ‘tis supposed, as much is re-exported to foreign nations, as 
repays all the bullion carried to these places, and a considerable balance besides”62. 
Discussion of global trading linkages reveals the integral part that China had in 
the international trade system. In this sense, Eurocentrism and Sinocentrism both 
misrepresent the diversity of European worldviews in the eighteenth century, 
where many contemplated the multiple poles involved in global trade.
Over the course of the eighteenth century, as the support for mercantilism 
waned, there was less concern over the negative balance of trade with China. 
Although China sold European luxury goods in exchange for precious metals, the 
trade was recognized as part of a larger system of global commerce. Views of the 
China trade were not stagnant over the early modern period. European observers 
also understood that China’s trade policy changed and the Middle Kingdom was 
not as absolutely chained to their ancient maxims as previously supposed. The 
actual trade reflected an image of China as powerful and not entirely inflexible.
59 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 565.
60 R. Cantillon, Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général, ed. and transl. H. Higgs, C. B. Reissued 
for The Royal Economic Society by Frank Cass and Co., LTD. (London, 1959), Part III, Chapter 
I: ‘Of Foreign Trade’.
61 Montesquieu also described the global trade system that connected the Americas, Asia, Africa 
and Europe. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 392. For the original French see Montesquieu, De 
l’esprit des lois, 71.
62 J. Randall, A System of Geography; or, a Dissertation on the Creation and various Phoenomena of the 
Terraqueous Globe […] (London: printed for J. Lord, 1744), 344.
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VI. Conclusion
By the end of the eighteenth century Europeans were still looking for solutions 
to expand the China trade. Alexander Dalrymple – a Scottish born East India 
Company traveler and researcher who spent time in Canton tirelessly trying to 
develop a more open international commerce – argued in 1769 that the China 
trade should be moved from Canton to Balambangan Island, near Borneo, where 
the duties would be less and trade would be freer. He pointed out this was also 
in the interest of the Chinese merchants who could be freed from the Hong 
Merchants, whom they had to pay to preserve their privileges63. In a neutral land, 
both the British and Chinese merchants would benefit from independence from 
their respective governments. This perspective allies the interests of the British 
and Chinese governments against British and Chinese merchants. Dalrymple’s 
suggestion reflects how the linear story of Europeans entering the modern 
world with Smith’s advocation of the free market while the Chinese stagnated 
due to isolationism, fails to capture the nuanced views and various agendas of 
eighteenth century observers.
The comments in geographical, philosophical and primary works available 
in Europe indicate a well-rounded and complex understanding of China’s policy 
towards foreign trade. First, there was an appreciation of China’s motivations 
and unique ability to focus inward and rely on internal markets throughout 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Second, the problems contributing 
to the difficult trade relationship were not always seen as stemming from the 
Chinese. National rivalries and the monopolistic system of the European trading 
companies were deemed hindering forces on the European side. Finally, there was 
awareness of actual trade and of active Chinese encouragement of foreign trade, 
as well as knowledge that China’s formal policy did not always dictate reality. 
The debate over the balance of trade with China reveals an understanding of the 
multiple poles involved in global commerce. The narrative of Chinese isolation 
was not a post-Enlightenment construction; however, it reflects only part of a 
wider context of the early modern discussion on the China trade that points to 
European commentators and observers who understood China’s unique capacity 
to gain wealth from domestic trade; who did not assume the superiority of their 
trading policies; and who recognized China’s integral place in the early modern 
world.
63 Alexander Darlymple, A Full and Clear Proof that the Spaniards can have no Claim to Balambangan 
(London: J. Nourse, 1774), 13-16 and 96.
